The paper addressed a situation of how a retail chain consisting of suppliers, agents, and distributors transformed while the costs of transactions increased. When the costs increased, the orders and deliveries between relevant interest groups resulted in the formation of the most costs' tolerant retail chain. The participants of the most tolerant chain remained in equilibrium under condition that in any transaction the gain of trade exceeded the transaction cost. Making to buy and sale decisions, the participants of the chain supposed to follow the rules and norms of what the author called a monotonic game. 
Introduction
All, perhaps, know that prices on commodity markets sometimes continue to rise unabated on the back of an anticipated shortage in the global raw materials availability and sharp volatility in the commodity future markets and terminal prices on fears of an immediate shortage of materials in the short term. Along with the significant increase in commodity prices, on one hand, the transaction costs increase on inputs like petroleum, electricity, etc. On the other, while currency of exchange rates also moving adversely, the situation becomes uncertain. As an example, one may point at recent market price increase of coffee raw materials, which did not have immediate consequences for some known positions, while the distributors 1 of a retail chain, however, demonstrate readiness to make loosing transactions. With this in mind, distributors are trying to hold prices constant. However, it is also understandable that it would be impossible for the distributor to make frequent price changes again and again. Given the current context, they will have no other option but to seek price increase for distributed commodities with an immediate effect.
Uncertainties in market prices of commodities always lead to an increase of transaction costs. Transaction costs increase once again leads to additional uncertainties, and the distributors in the retail chain end up in a dead circle of price increase, which may result that the bilateral trade does not take place, and the market old supply and demand structure to be replaced with a new. In the environment of constant price increase, the orders and deliveries do not match any more for a given supply and demand structure. In such situations, individual participants in the retail chain are still assumed to act rationally finding a new ways of making business with the object of maximizing the profit by trying to restructure the chain. Worth to note that New Institutional Economics gives an explanation for transactions as mediated through the market in two directions: the vertical integration, Joskow [2, 2005] , where the market structure is mostly a vertical chain of semi-product components, and the horizontal chain of services and products outsourced by companies if needed to produce the end product.
This paper addresses the above situation in question by setting up a retail chain game of the participants in the chain grounding on supposition that orders and deliveries be met with uncertainty of transaction costs. In so doing, the paper attempts to develop a numerical description of the supply and demand structure for the deliveries of commodities in the retail chain. The allegedly rational behavior of a participant is not always such, because the participants on purpose may attempt to enter but irrationally into certain losing transactions in hope to offset the negative effect of the former. Given this irrational situation the prices will increase additionally upon already profitable transactions. Numerical analysis of irrational situations reveals, however, that in case the participants will try to avoid all losing transactions, their behavior is once again becoming rational and in such situations the participants of the retail chain will end up in the Nash equilibrium [8, 1953] .
To our knowledge (or lack of that), the retail chain formation, or in mundane terms the restructuring process of the retail chain is rather complicated mathematical problem, which do not have satisfactory solutions. However, in recent years it has become clear that a mathematical structure known as antimatroid is well suited for such type a retail chain formation process, c.f., Algaba, et al. [1, 2004] . Antimatroid is a collection of potential interests groups-subsets of participants, i.e. those who make decisions to buy and sale in bilateral trade transactions. That is to say, within antimatroid one will always find a path of transactions connecting members of the retail chain-if the latter forms of course-with each other by mutual business interests inside groups/coalitions belonging to antimatroid and making the exchange as participants of a characteristic retail chain.
We step up beyond convention of the theory of coalition games that the solution mandatory has to be a core, and take the retail chain formation process in terms of so-called defining sequence of transactions, Mullat [6, 1979] . The sequence facilitates the retail chain formation as a transformation process of nested sets of bilateral transactions, which ends at its last and highest costs' threshold-the most tolerant retail chain towards costs-a kernel. Hereby, the kernel operates as a retail chain of participants capable to cover the highest transaction costs in case of uncertainty. In our case, the defining sequence of transactions produces the elements of an antimatroid-some interest groups, c.f., Levit and Kempner, [5, 2001] ; see also Korte et al., [4, 1991] . The defining sequence on antimatroid, in particular, follows the Greedy heuristic procedure of Shapley's value, but in inverse order, c.f., Rapoport [10, 1985] .
Bearing all this in mind, the suggested framework allows performing a series of computer simulations. First, to determine the possible response of the retail chain participants, to different supply and demand structures. Second, to identify the participants, where the executive efforts might be applied to prevent unpredictable actions that may misbalance the equilibrium in the retail chain. With this object, we used a model to assemble an "elasticity" measure for the choice of customers; this measure is represented by transaction costs' interval, for which the retail chain remains in equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section sets up the basic concepts intending to bring at the surface the calculus of utilities of participants in the retail chain. It is a preliminary step necessary to move forward to the Section 3, where the general model of participants of the chain is described. In Section 4, which is main part of the paper, the retail chain game of customers addresses the process of the chain formation in details. Here the monotonic property of utilities plays its major role. A summary of the results ends the study.
Description of a retail chain: the simple form
To consider the simplest case of commodities distribution in a retail chain might be instructive. This elementary model is used at current stage solely as a convenient means of simplifying the presentation.
The distribution of commodities in the retail chain is characterized by sales figures that may be expressed as one of the following three alternative numbers: a) a demand  which is disclosed to the particular participant either externally or by other participant in the chain; b) a capable supply  calculated at the cost of all commodities produced by the participant for delivery outside the chain or to the other participants; c) actual sales  calculated at the prices actually paid by the customers for the delivered commodities.
An order is thus defined as a certain quantity of a particular commodity ordered by one of the participant's from another participant in the retail chain; a delivery is similarly defined as a certain quantity of a commodity delivered by one of the participant's to another participant in the chain. We assume that the chain includes suppliers who are only capable of making deliveries -the produces; participants, who both issue orders and make deliveries -the agents; and the distributors, who only order commodities from other participants. 1 In what follows we consider the retail chain of orders and deliveries for the case like "pipeline" distribution without "closed circuits." Therefor, we can always identify a unique direction of "retail chain" of orders from the distributors to the produces via agents and a "retail chain" of deliveries in the reverse direction. 1 In subsequent sections, the distributors also act as suppliers to external customers.
Let us consider in more detail this particular retail chain of orders and deliveries of commodities. The direction of the chain of orders (deliveries) is defined by assigning serial numbers -the indexes 2 1, and 3 -to the producer, to the agent, and to the distributor, respectively. The producer and the agent act as suppliers, the agent and the distributor act as customers. The agent thus has the dual role of a supplier and a customer, whereas the producer only acts as a supplier and the distributor only acts as a customer.
The chain of orders to the produces from the customers is characterized by two numbers  , 23  are used as the admissible bounds on transaction costs, which are assumed to be unknown. It is in this sense we construct a model of a monotonic game of customers, Mullat [6, 1979] .
Description of a retail chain: the general form
Consider now a retail chain consisting of n participants indexed w , n ,.. Let us now impose certain constrains on the admissible vectors in this retail chain. The following constrains are strictly "local," i.e., they apply to the individual participants in the retail chain.
The admissible retail chain states are constrained by balance conditions equating the actual sales from all the suppliers to a particular customer to capable sales of that customer acting as a supplier:
We also require balance conditions between the cost of orders placed by all the customers with a particular supplier and the demand figure of that supplier acing as a customer:
As we have noted above, the retail chain considered in this article does not allow "closedcircuit motion" of orders or deliveries until a particular order reaches a producer or the delivery reaches a distributor. The indexes labeling the participants in such chains are ordered in a way 4 that if w is a supplier and j is a customer, then 
For the supplier w , the number wj  is the fractional cost of orders made to the customer j . For customer j , the number wj  is the fractional cost of the deliveries from supplier w , which are necessary for meeting the sales target.
Suppose that purchase of orders in the retail chain move from distributors through agents to suppliers. This chain is conducted at the wholesale prices. The deliveries, also conducted at the wholesale prices of the chain in the opposite direction. We express the effective wholesale prices by a set of constants wj
), which represent the participant's cost per one bank note of sales for a customer acting as a supplier.
The set of constants wj  , wj  and wj  make it possible to uniquely determine the amount of orders and deliveries in a given transaction. Indeed, the amount of orders to the supplier w from the customer j is given by In conclusion, let us consider one computational aspect of order and delivery vectors in a retail-type distribution chain. 5 (1) and (2) 
The starting data in (4) is the demand of the distributors to external customers, i.e., the
. The starting data in (5) 
A monotonic game of customers in the retail chain
In the previous section we considered a retail-type distribution in the chain with partici-
: the index j identifiers a customer, the index w identifiers a supplier.
Let us interpret the activity of the retail chain as a monotonic game, Mullat [6, 1979] , in which the customers need to decide from what supplier to order a particular commodity.
Suppose that in addition to the cost of materials, the customers bear uncertain transaction costs in their bilateral trade with suppliers. Because of the uncertainty of transaction costs, it is quite possible that in some transactions the costs will exceed the gross profit from sales. In this case, the potentially feasible transactions will not take place.
Let the set j R represents all the potential transactions corresponding to the set of suppliers from which the customer j is to make his choice. The choice of the customer j represents the customer's joint choice. It is readily seen that the sets j R are finite and nonintersecting; their union corresponds to set
In what follows, we focus on the criterion by which the customer j chooses his suppliers j A while the lowest transaction costs, as a threshold o u , increases. In contrast to the standard monotonic game, Mullat [6, 1979] , which is based on a coalition formation, we will consider the strategy of individual customers whose objective is to maximize the profit from the actual sales revenues. We will thus essentially deal with m players' game, k n m   . 5 Here we need only consider the principles of the computational procedure.
Let us first introduce a measure of the utility of a transaction between customer j and sup- 
If the constrains (6) are satisfied, then the same constrains are of necessity satisfied on the subsets j A of the set j R . Thus, restricting (4) and (5) 
where wj u are the customer j transaction costs allocable to the supplier 
The property of monotone utility leads to certain conclusions concerning the behavior of customers depending on the individual utility criterion. Under certain conditions, rational behavior of customer j (i.e., maximization of the profit j  ) is equivalent to avoid profitloosing transaction with all the suppliers j A w  . This aspect is not made explicit in Mullat [7, 1979] , although it is quite obvious. Thus, using the lemma, see the English version at ). 6 The joint choice of users having this property is generally interpreted in the sense of Nash equilibrium, [8, 1953] , see also Owen, [9, 1968] . 7 We recall that j q  is the fractional cost of all the orders placed with supplier q . is thus a measure of a "risk" that the customer will get into non-equilibrium situation. Clearly, a customer with a small interval will have grater difficulties to maintain the equilibrium than a customer with a wide interval.
Lemma

Final remarks
It ends where we started. The paper investigated a situation of distributing commodities in the retail chain with participants making "to buy and sales" decisions in a retail chain. One type of participants' produce and sale, others buy and sale, the third only buy for consumption. The price system was set up via some constants, which are nothing but percentages to perform calculus of how the sales price must depend and exceed the purchasing prices to archive a satisfactory results for participants maximizing their profits. The situation becomes complex as soon as to buy and sale decisions incorporated transaction costs. Transaction costs interact into the behavior of participants by transforming potentially profitable into loosing transactions. The paper investigated the situation, as global, depending on the transaction costs' threshold varying the threshold from low to high values until all transactions, allegedly profitable in bilateral trade agreements, became loosing and do not any more form a basis for an agreement between rational participants. The retail chain structure, while the transaction costs' threshold is increasing, changes like nested set of retail chains each of them on the higher threshold is capable to counteract higher transaction costs and still functioning in equilibrium. Condition for such a rational behavior was that all participants in the retail chain must avoid any loosing transaction. Beyond the goal of the retail chain formation to hold the retail chain in equilibrium, some elasticity intervals for transaction costs, where it still was realistic to buy and sale rationally, have been internally encoded into the scheme and calculated individually for all participants in the chain.
